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ABSTRACT 
 
by  
 
Maria Jose Flor Ágreda 
 
In Ecuador, media and politics have been historically tied together. Over time, the 
banking industry has had financial stakes in the media and vice versa. Yet, from the time 
that President Rafael Correa took office in 2007, the situation has been turned around. 
Correa has used a permanent campaign to appeal to the public and change the media 
ownership environment of the country. The President’s strategy has included the 
acquisition of private media such as newspapers, and radio and television station; as well 
as the establishment of governmental media entities. Additionally, as part of Correa’s 
permanent campaign scheme, the president has used state-mandated time slots in all 
public and private broadcasting channels — known as cadenas nacionales (national 
chains) — to carry out his political agenda and to criticize the press and its coverage of 
the government.  
This has created a political rift between the public and private sector, giving way 
to a media war. Through it, the media criticize the president and his policies, and the 
president, in turn, verbally attacks the media. Due to that, national and international 
media organizations have concluded that there is a chilling effect among the Ecuadorian 
press. 
This paper analyzed the content of opinion columns for one of the most important 
privately owned newspapers in Ecuador, El Universo. The research analyzed the 
negativity levels of the columns for three periods during the time that Correa has been in 
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office, and showed increasing levels of negativity in them. Thus, the analysis lends 
support to the argument that Correa’s public criticisms on the media have not created a 
chilling effect. 
 
 
KEYWORDS:  
Ecuador; Rafael Correa; Permanent Campaigning; Press Freedom; Chilling Effect; 
Media. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Media and Politics in Latin America 
Given that mass media have significant political impact among a country’s 
electorate, in Latin America, the mass media — mostly print and broadcast — (Rettberg 
and Rincón 20) have been described as the fourth branch of government (Rettberg and 
Rincón 2). Journalists and media corporations impart information upon the public and 
through that, promote transparency among the political systems of various Latin 
American countries. This means that, because of the information imparted to the public, 
mass media have assumed the role of guardians of government (Rettberg and Rincón 2).  
Yet, given that media are a business in need of survival, which are mostly owned 
by private media corporations, they fall victim to economic competition. It is therefore 
common for media to depict content that is sensationalized and appeals to the emotions of 
consumers instead of reporting content that is important and in the public’s interest. 
Hence, the coverage that media competition produces often causes cynicism and 
alienation among the electorate of a country. This ultimately leads for people to begin to 
distrust government and its entities (Rettberg and Rincón 2). 
 The purposes of educating the public through promoting governmental 
accountability while at the same time having to compete for an audience in order to 
economically survive are the root of a turbulent relationship that media have had with 
political systems and governments in most Latin American countries (Rettberg and 
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Rincón 4). This relationship raises questions regarding whether media are vital for 
governmental functioning and the promotion of democratic values, an evil to be 
combatted, or both (Rettberg and Rincón 3).  
Do private media ownership and its interests affect a media entity’s news 
coverage? Do mass media get used and abused by politicians, journalists, or owners of 
media entities? Do media represent a contribution or an obstacle to democracy in a nation 
(Rettberg and Rincón 1)? These are frequent questions that arise pertaining to the value 
that media have in the politics of a country and the importance between governance and 
the press.  
 It is widely understood that press freedoms are an important aspect of democracy 
and civil liberties in a country (Rettberg and Rincón 21). Yet, through the use of 
permanent campaigning — which comprises an aggressive method of “political 
marketing … and the trend towards personality and image-based politics” (Sparrow and 
Turner 985) — plebiscitary governments tend to advance an agenda that has the potential 
to greatly silence an opposition (Rettberg and Rincón 2). Therefore, given that the 
interests of private media owners tend to be incompatible with those of many country 
executives, the media in such countries have become an inalienable type of opposition to 
the governments of such countries (Santander 232).  
This, in turn, leads for another conundrum. If privately owned media become the 
opposition, then they tend to fight a constant battle with certain governments (Santander 
231). Such governments, then, can fight back by restricting and censoring such media. 
Therefore, if the battle between the media and political powers propagate in a country, 
what happens to the country’s press freedom? 
 3
 
Democracy and Press Freedom 
Adherents to the concept of liberal democracy state that politics in any country 
should look to establish a great degree of liberty for people, which includes the granting 
of rights such as freedom of speech and the right of association, as well as providing a 
governmental system that is supported by competition, participation, and contestation 
(O’Neil 110). Hence, in a liberal democracy, people have the power to participate in 
government through voting in elections and/or competing for public office — including 
political party associations and the right to compete in fair elections (Danziger 75). 
Scholars use the term “liberal democracy” to indicate a specific form of “political system 
that promotes participation, competition, and liberty” (O’Neil 110). 
Thus, it is typically understood that in a liberal democracy the media are “free to 
publish whatever they want” (Rettberg and Rincón 21). In a country where liberal 
democracy exists, the media are expected to freely criticize and even attack the 
government with the “purpose of improving society” (Rettberg and Rincón 21). For this 
to occur in a democratic manner, journalists and journalistic entities must be autonomous 
in their decisions regarding coverage and criticisms of government.  
Information about governmental actions, intrinsic to a society that promotes 
democratic values, results in wider public participation (Rettberg and Rincón 3). 
However, for the democratic values of such a society to thrive through the press, media 
outlets need not focus on the political formation of the citizenry and instead focus on 
providing useful information to the public. This means that for democracy to thrive 
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through the press, the media must provide well-produced and unbiased information 
(WANIFRA 6). 
Yet, in some cases, the private interests of those who own media, often 
compromise the democratic values that the press is set to promote (Rettberg and Rincón 
3). Consequently, private media entities in Latin America have been known to corrode the 
information passed along to the public. It is important to note that private media, which 
have private interests in their coverage due to their dependency on advertising revenue, 
can censor information much like a government in need of public approval is likely to 
adapt information for the public’s eyes (Checa-Godoy 4). 
Given the aforementioned conflicts of interest that privately owned media 
constantly face, some governments in Latin America have pushed for the establishment 
of a media system that is “socially responsible.” In such governments, media have the 
“obligation to provide information and balance to society” (Rettberg and Rincón 21). 
While this may not be considered to be a free system of media by the liberal democracy 
standard — because media cannot simply publish anything they want — the 
establishment of social responsibility among the media of a country allow for “the 
construction of civil society” (Rettberg and Rincón 21).  
Through the propagation of the idea of civil responsibility among media, some 
governments in Latin America look to propagate balanced coverage and equal access to 
media (Waisbord 97). Such government then create responsibilities for privately owned 
media — voted or decreed into law — to have balanced and diverse content and inform 
the public on the important issues of the day (Rettberg and Rincón 24). In fact, 
“compared with the more spontaneous liberal model, the benefits of the social 
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responsibility model in the press are clear” (Rettberg and Rincón 24) as they seek to 
protect society. In a sense, the protection the state looks to guarantee relates to tasteless 
content as well as information that “could generate panic or violence” (Rettberg and 
Rincón 24). Hence, governments that want to establish a model of social responsibility 
for the media, tend to want to institute a sort of national political consensus, brought 
about by their concept of balanced coverage. 
Even though the social responsibility model can be established in order to 
guarantee fairer news coverage, private economic factors remain a dominant force when 
it comes to news coverage (Punín Larrea 2). Given that private media have a necessity to 
survive through advertising revenue, the press in countries with a social responsibility 
model for media become subject to two types of censorship or control. These include 
censorship from the state, which seeks to ensure balance in the coverage, and the 
censorship that comes from the private interests of media owners (Rettberg and Rincón 
2).  
This leads to further issues, however, as the commercial and political elite, which 
have ownership of media in most of Latin America, tend to “not act as guarantors of the 
democratic order” (Checa-Godoy 3). Consequently, instead of being socially responsible 
with coverage, media owners are likely to use media to protect their private financial 
interests and those of their friends (Checa-Godoy 3). Hence, when private interests, and 
not newsworthy coverage — stories that appeal to the public interest — are the driving 
factors of media reportage, private ownership of media becomes a threat to press freedom 
and to the spread of democratic values (Rettberg and Rincón 3). Additionally, all of those 
who are against the interests of such private groups —which often include governments 
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or certain governmental figures — become rivals of the media and are consequently 
attacked by it (Waisbord 100).  
In countries such as Argentina, Ecuador, and Venezuela, such attacks to media 
come from those governments’ permanent campaigning methods. A permanent campaign 
can be described as the method to seamlessly join the “techniques of political 
campaigning with the act of governing” (Conaghan and de la Torre 267). Thus, a 
permanent campaign is the constant branding of a government in broadcast and print 
media. In the aforementioned countries, governments’ permanent campaigning strategies 
have prominently used national chains as a method of reaching out to people and 
spreading their message to raise public approval for their political agenda. National 
chains are “public service messages” (Conaghan and de la Torre 267) that are broadcasted 
over a number of television and radio stations at the same time. Consequently, in such 
governments, national chains have not only been use as a method of permanent 
campaigning to raise public approval, but also, as a mechanism to openly criticize media 
and its coverage in front of a country’s entire electorate. 
 This has led to a rise in conflict between leftist, populist countries in Latin 
America and the privately owned media in such countries, giving birth to their 
“oppositional polarization” or “media wars” (Kitzberger 5). These “media wars” — 
between governments and media — are “fought openly in front of the public” (Kitzberger 
5), becoming a prominent political feature among populist governments in Latin 
America. Such fights make such governments seem as though they are constantly 
fighting to restrain press freedom and democratic values — as understood by standards 
related to liberal democracy (Kitzberger 6, 8). 
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Purpose of the Study and Summary 
 
This study looked at the permanent campaign style of Ecuadorian President 
Rafael Correa and his uses of media for the permanent campaign. With the understanding 
that his permanent campaigning infringes upon normal news broadcasting and is often 
used to target journalists and media outlets through constant public criticism (Ayala 7), I 
analyzed the existence of a possible chilling effect.  Through this, I attempted to grasp the 
chilling effect that the permanent campaign in Ecuador, and Correa’s plebiscitary rule has 
on privately owned media. In order to assess this, this study used content analysis to 
analyze columns from a prominent, Ecuadorian privately owned newspaper, El Universo. 
The columns were measured for levels of negativity to infer if the newspaper had press 
freedom, represented by it printing increasingly negative columns about the government, 
or if the newspaper is under a chilling effect, represented by an increase in positivity 
regarding the government.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
 This chapter integrates the scholarship pertinent to the areas of research relevant 
to the proposed analysis. In order to complete this research it was important to explore 
our current understanding of 1) what is a permanent campaign, how it works, and how it 
is applicable in the case of Ecuador and its current President Rafael Correa; 2) what is 
plebiscitary governance, how it affects politics and how it is relevant to current 
Ecuadorian politics; and 3) the media situation in Ecuador with a recent historical 
overview and its relationship to politics in the country. The combinations of these three 
concepts comprise the foundation upon which this study is based — that the rising 
plebiscitary governance of president Rafael Correa, which includes a permanent 
campaign suggested to be partly used to attack private media in Ecuador, is likely to lead 
to a decrease in press freedoms in the country by creating and inducting a chilling effect 
among journalists and commentators of such media. Such a chilling effect, journalists 
say, has the potential to cause “a reluctance to publish freely and pursue stories 
aggressively” (Trager, Russomanno, and Dente Ross 134) out of fear of attack by the 
government or legal repercussions by such, which can include lawsuits and/or 
imprisonment.  
 
The Permanent Campaign 
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In December 1976, Patrick H. Caddell, a young pollster for the Jimmy Carter 
presidential campaign, submitted a memo to the then-president-elect titled Initial Working 
Paper on Political Strategy. The memo expanded on Caddell’s conclusions that 
governing with public approval requires a continuing political campaign or a permanent 
campaign. Caddell realized that media could have an enormous impact on public opinion 
(Klein). This was a significant conclusion, as the American presidency had to constantly 
appeal to its constituency to increase and maintain high levels of public support (Ornstein 
and Mann 17).  
The concept of the permanent campaign was also embraced by journalist Sidney 
Blumenthal, who, in his book The Permanent Campaign, described the method of 
governance as a perpetual method of promotion, which turns government into an 
institution meant to maintain an elected official’s popularity (Blumenthal 11). In fact, 
Blumenthal stated that the permanent campaign became a form of analyzing presidential 
politics, and how country executives marry their techniques of political campaigning with 
their act of governing in a seamless junction (Conaghan and de la Torre 267).  
Therefore, through the wide-ranging concept that comprises the permanent 
campaign, Americans, as well as people and politicians from other parts of the world, 
have come to understand its importance. In fact, the permanent campaign has been 
persistently used as an essential element in the act of governing (Conaghan and de la 
Torre 269). This comes from the understanding that permanent campaigning occurs when 
the “process of campaigning and the process of governing have each lost their 
distinctiveness,” (Ornstein and Mann 219) and allows for a single process of 
campaigning and governing.  
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Hence, by combining political campaigning techniques with the act of governing, 
the permanent campaign becomes indispensable in the analysis of the success of 
presidential politics based on a politician’s popularity (Blumenthal 11). This leaves 
politicians and candidates for public office in a continual campaign mode, always 
working for public attention (Conaghan 47). Consequently, by joining political marketing 
techniques with actual governance, politicians and elected officials can use the media for 
the purpose of augmenting executive power, and increasing their popularity and 
acceptance among the electorate (Conaghan and de la Torre 268). This makes the 
permanent campaign an intrinsic aspect of modern politics, as through mass media, 
political groups and candidates for office can take advantage of “attention grabbing 
media events to communicate their causes directly to a mass audience” (Ornstein and 
Mann 22). 
Given that the most obvious and relatable description of the permanent campaign 
is “campaigning and governing merging into one indiscriminate mass” (Ornstein and 
Mann 1), it is important to note that the study of a permanent campaign is prevalent 
because it directly affects people. In fact, a permanent campaign “is not the way the 
electorate does politics, but rather, the way politics is done to the electorate” (Conaghan 
and de la Torre 268), by politicians and political consultants. Permanent campaigning has 
therefore become the only stable means of political involvement that most people 
experience. This is mostly due to the fact that political marketing and its inescapability 
take place in a perpetual manner, which allows politicians to obtain the vital public 
support and approval needed for their political success (Ornstein and Mann 1-3).  
This has turned the permanent campaign into more than a package of techniques 
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used to promote presidential popularity. For instance, in some Latin American countries, 
the permanent campaign has become an intrinsic practice that presidents and 
governments use to “stay in power and to pursue political projects aimed at reconfiguring 
power relations” (Conaghan and de la Torre 281). Nowadays, Latin American presidents 
— especially those in the political “left” or “pink tide” — have become increasingly 
concerned with their “public communication strategies … [and have established] media 
practices intended for direct communication with larger publics” (Kitzberger 9).  
Politicians in Latin America, especially populist ones — who form part of Latin 
America’s political left turn — are aware of the importance of poll-driven and media-
focused election campaigns (de la Torre and Conaghan 337). This mindfulness goes 
beyond the media’s usefulness in terms of elections, but also of its usefulness once a 
politician is elected to office. For instance, given the necessity to connect with “the mass 
public in unmediated ways and keeping presidential polling numbers high” (Conaghan 
and de la Torre 269) has led for media-centric country executives to constantly seek to 
mobilize public opinion even after being elected. Therefore, through a pervasive media 
presence, such presidents “sought to mobilize public approval” (Conaghan and de la 
Torre 269) so as to carry through with their political agenda. 
The permanent campaigning strategy is then born through constant media 
presence and is created in such a way that campaign consultants and media experts play a 
significant role in influencing government and policy (Ornstein and Mann 219). By 
turning the process of campaigning and the process of governing into an amalgamated 
endeavor, the permanent campaign transforms governance into a “twenty-four hour 
campaign cycle of pseudo-events for citizen consumption” (Ornstein and Mann 30). This 
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way, the permanent campaign becomes the constant push to “connect the president 
directly to voters, with minimal interfering or ‘filtering’” (Conaghan 53). 
In the case of newly rising leftist, populist governments in Latin America, 
presidents’ need to directly appeal to the public has risen from the area’s “acute crisis of 
governability” (Conaghan and de la Torre 269). Due to this, newly elected leftist 
governments have turned to practices that include “regular or sporadic presidential 
broadcasts, travelling cabinets1, and the communicative instrumentalization of public 
occasions or ceremonies” (Kitzberger 9). They have used such not only to spread their 
political agenda among their electorate, but also to increase their popularity and approval.  
Hence, given that presidents are in constant communication with their electorate, they 
tend to reject practices such as press conferences and interviews with the press 
(Kitzberger 9) as they provide information to the public through their own means.  
Through the constant media presence presidents have in their countries, their 
electorate is able to learn about national affairs and participate in the government’s 
politics and political agenda. Sometimes, governments tend to use ulterior motives that 
tell the people what they want to hear in a manner that furthers a politician’s cause 
against his or her opposition (Ornstein and Mann 32). Consequently, elected officials are 
able to manipulate public approval and even mobilize public opinion in ways that enable 
them to govern without the necessity of congressional approval to implement new 
policies (Conaghan and de la Torre 269). This is due to the fact that through an effective 
permanent campaign, politicians can make their case and convince their electorate to 
                                                 
1 A travelling cabinet refers to when a president travels throughout his or her country and brings members 
of his or her cabinet along so as to have a greater political presence.  
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support their cause more easily than they would the legislature (Conaghan 47).    
Additionally, in order to further their agenda with the public and spread their 
political agenda to as many people as possible, “pink tide” presidents have resorted to 
practices that “bypass and contest mainstream media journalism, which is deemed to be 
dominated by media owners and therefore biased and distorting” (Kitzberger 9). Thus, to 
further their permanent campaigns, presidents use mostly public media to disseminate 
their message, or privately owned media that is “politically aligned” with the president’s 
public agenda (Kitzberger 10). When presidents communicate with their electorate, their 
messages are likely to contain criticism of media and journalistic coverage of 
governmental issues with intention to “unveil and contest” (Kitzberger 9-10) such 
coverage. 
Arguably, the most important tools that Latin American governments use to 
communicate directly with their electorate are cadenas nacionales or “national chains.” 
Governments use national chains to “spread official messages about the different 
functions of the State” (FUNDAMEDIOS 1). These messages are called chains because 
they are “by law, broadcasted on all radio and television channels” (Cronista), causing a 
chain effect as individuals cannot change the television or radio channels without running 
into the government’s mandated broadcast. Given the laws of some countries, such as 
Argentina, Ecuador, or Venezuela, laws state that national chains be broadcast on all 
channels, including those that don’t publically support the government (Republic of 
Argentina, Law 26.522, Article 75). Additionally, in some countries such as Ecuador, 
laws state that “television stations are obliged to provide the government with free air 
time for national public service broadcasts” (Conaghan and de la Torre 276). 
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Thus, through the permanent campaign, every message that is disseminated to the 
public becomes a tactic to get votes or approval (Ornstein and Mann 17). Therefore, the 
study and understanding of the permanent campaign and its possible effects on 
democracy is important. This is due to the fact that, depending on how it is used, 
permanent campaigning can increase hostility and recklessness in politics as it disregards 
the fact that a country’s electorate can mistake political persuasions for reality (Ornstein 
and Mann 4). 
 Yet, permanent campaigns, which target entire electorates and have the power to 
reach people in remote areas through mass media, can be considered to be one of the 
most democratic forms of governance and campaigning (Ornstein and Mann 233). This 
can be understood as such given that permanent campaigns constantly bombard the 
populace with propagandist information, making everyone who watches and/or listens to 
the message, a potential participant in the process (Ornstein and Mann 125). Given that 
elected officials can use mass media to get their message out to the public, governments 
can sometimes take advantage of the varied resources such as broadcast and print media. 
Thus, through such resources, governments can create permanent campaigning 
environments that result in “uneven playing fields” for a country’s political opposition 
(Conaghan and de la Torre 281).  
 While a permanent campaign might consist of democratic values in the sense that 
it looks to appeal to the general public, it has the potential to turn a government into a 
plebiscite (Lowi 97). A plebiscitary government is one that seeks public approval so that 
the public constantly participates and, through referenda, passes legislation in favor of the 
president (Conaghan and de la Torre 281). This renders a country’s legislation without 
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actual power to legislate as the president can bypass it by making the people vote 
legislation that abides by his or her agenda (Conaghan and de la Torre 268).  
The permanent campaign has over time developed into a government’s new 
approach of governance in the sense that “presidents seek to mobilize public opinion 
directly in order to govern ‘over the heads of congress and the party leaders’” (Conaghan 
and de la Torre 282). Hence, with the progressively overwhelming amount of public 
support that a country’s executive is able to obtain through his or her permanent 
campaigning, opposition parties run the risk of having weaker power in a country’s 
legislation system (Lowi 195). This, in turn, allows for a president to stop his or her role 
of “bargainer” with the country’s legislators, as he or she can easily opt to publically 
appeal to the electorate and make a case for public support (Conaghan and de la Torre 
260). Hence, as previously stated, through permanent campaigning, a country’s executive 
can bypass a noncompliant legislature by simply appealing to the public.  
If country executives use governmental resources to saturate their electorate with 
messages through national chains and/or constant advertisements, media usage by the 
opposition has the potential to become highly disproportionate to that of the 
government’s (Conaghan and de la Torre 281). Thus, in governments where presidents 
take advantage of their country’s media resources to suppress the political power of their 
opposition, a permanent campaign can be regarded as a “potential minefield for 
democratic politics” (Conaghan and de la Torre 282). 
Given that democracy promotes equalized governmental participation and 
competition (Danziger 75), the fact that in some countries, permanent campaigning has 
the potential to transform politics to enhance the power of the governing president or 
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political party, can be construed as antidemocratic (Tenpas and McCan 350). As 
permanent campaigns are enhanced by a government’s regulatory policies, presidents can 
implement restrictive campaign laws that limit or prohibit the use of public resources for 
political purposes while using them limitlessly to further their political agenda (Conaghan 
and de la Torre 281). Through this, governments can block the opposition from exposing 
its views to the electorate through the media.  
The uneven playing field turns a permanent campaign into something far more 
than a technique for maintaining or obtaining public support, but instead, a method of 
silencing the opposition. Silencing the opposition becomes increasingly vital to 
presidents and governments in order to remain in power (Conaghan and de la Torre 281). 
Consequently, in such cases, a permanent campaign is not a promoter of equal 
participation. Instead, the permanent campaign has polarizing effects in the politics of a 
country and promotes inconsistency in its governance as the incumbent president has a 
disproportionate advantage over his or her opposition (Charnock 18).  
Although the permanent campaign is a concept coined by American strategists, 
given the internationalization of American electioneering, in places such as Latin 
America, the rise of an extreme form of a permanent campaigning has the potential to 
turn government figures into avid permanent campaigners (Conaghan and de la Torre 
269). As previously stated, such governments have developed to constantly focus on 
appealing to the public, instead of legislators (Conaghan and de la Torre 268). 
Much like their American counterparts, Latin American presidents confront 
factionalized and unpredictable legislations and unmanageable party coalitions (de la 
Torre and Conaghan 339). Therefore, the use of unmediated ways of connecting with the 
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electorate become vitally necessary to keep a country’s executive’s support numbers high 
and become “normal tools of the trade,” (Conaghan and de la Torre 261). In this manner, 
country presidents become media-centric, realizing that outreach through media is a key 
“strategy aimed at highlighting their personal attributes” (de la Torre and Conaghan 347) 
and political agenda.  
As much as high acceptance among the electorate and high public approval 
priority for most Latin American countries, those in the Andean region have stood out as 
countries with extreme forms of permanent campaigning that have led to extreme 
plebiscitary governments (Conaghan 47). Over the last decade, in countries such as 
Venezuela, Bolivia and Ecuador, plebiscitary governments have risen out of acute crises 
of governability, which have led the institution of the presidency of those countries to 
become highly plebiscitary (Conaghan and de la Torre 269).  
In fact, the plebiscitary governance, a direct result of the permanent campaign, 
has become a new development for Ecuadorian politics as the country has gone through 
“multiple dysfunctions associated with the party system and its leadership,” (Conaghan, 
48). Throughout Ecuador’s recent history, especially from the transition out of military 
rule in 1979, the country has experienced one of the highest indexes in party 
fragmentation in Latin America as well as electoral volatility (de la Torre and Conaghan 
339). In fact, the executive, legislative and court system of the country have been long 
described as innate and corrupt, where governance and legislation were made as measure 
of contracts with the purpose of carrying out the private endeavors of those who 
participated in them. Additionally, the political situation in Ecuador was volatile as the 
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ten years prior to 2006; three presidents had been unable to complete their four-year 
terms (Conaghan 48) and were thrown out of office.  
In order to maintain power and support from the electorate, Ecuadorian President 
Rafael Correa Delgado — who won the 2006 presidential election and took office in 
2007 — has followed in the footsteps of Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and 
Bolivian President Evo Morales, in launching a campaign that mobilizes public opinion 
not only to “win battles with congress, but to launch projects aimed at ‘re-founding’ their 
respective republics,” (Conaghan & de la Torre, 269). Though this, Correa took office 
with an agenda that was heavily dependent on public approval. If he was able to obtain 
the approval he needed from the electorate, then he and his political party, Alianza PAÍS -
Patria Altiva I Soberana, PAÍS Alliance - Proud and Sovereign Fatherland (Conaghan 
47) could gain majority power. Successive winning of important electoral contests, which 
included referenda, constituent assembly elections, and a succeeding round of 
presidential elections (Conaghan & de la Torre, 269), became crucial to Correa’s success.  
Hence, he and his government established a permanent campaign to accomplish such 
goals.  
Therefore, as Correa assumed office during a politically unstable time in Ecuador, 
he came into power with the full knowledge that he had to re-make the political system in 
the country through a “series of rapid-fire electoral events” (Conaghan & de la Torre, 
269). This allowed him to restructure and change the country’s constitution, grant the 
post of the executive more power, and reorganize the country’s party system to suit his 
and his party’s political agenda (Conaghan 47).  
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As previously stated, in the decade before Correa became president of Ecuador, 
the country was one of the most insecure democracies in Latin America. From 1997 to 
2005, the Ecuadorian public had forced three elected presidents: Abdalá Bucaram, Jamil 
Mahuad and Lucio Gutiérrez, out of office, before each was able to complete his four-
year term (de la Torre and Conaghan 339).2 This type of political precariousness, defined 
as “presidents interrupted” (de la Torre and Conaghan 340) made Correa supremely 
aware of the instability his office once sworn in as president. This was especially true 
given that mass public protests against an executive’s economic policies or corruptive 
manners had been responsible for the removal of Ecuador’s thee previous presidents from 
office, mostly “with the tacit approval of the armed forces” (Conaghan and de la Torre 
271).  
Consequently, it was important for Correa to take into account the unstable 
political situation in Ecuador when he took over the presidency so that he and his 
government could create an effective permanent campaign (Conaghan and de la Torre 
271). Such an effective campaign would help Correa not only remain in power, but also 
obtain high public approval levels. This was critical at the time, as power and approval 
were something that politicians from all parties, including governmental entities, lacked 
(Conaghan and de la Torre 271). 
When Correa began his campaign for the presidency in 2006, he did so as an 
outsider to the Ecuadorian political arena (Conaghan and de la Torre 271). In fact, before 
his presidential campaign, he had never run for public office and the only political post he 
had held was a just-over-100-days position as Minister of Economy to which he was 
                                                 
2 Ecuadorian presidents are elected to four-year terms with the contingency to run for reelection to another 
four years. They have a limit of two terms.  
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appointed to by interim president Alfredo Palacio in 2005 (de la Torre and Conaghan 
339) — Correa’s training as an economist, holding a doctorate from the University of 
Illinois helped him get appointed to the position (de la Torre and Conaghan 340). Yet, his 
swift tenure as minister of economy assured him an “image as a maverick and a virulent 
critic of neoliberal economic policies3” (Conaghan and de la Torre 271).  
Thus, Correa’s image allowed him to quickly form a political party and use it as a 
vehicle to run for the presidency in 2006. Even though Correa’s newly formed political 
party enticed many people who belong to leftist movements — especially those that had 
been instrumental in the removal of President Lucio Gutierrez from office in 2005 
(Conaghan 49) — the fragmented nature of Ecuadorian political parties indicated that 
Correa, even if elected, would have a hard time getting candidates elected as members of 
the incoming congress (Conaghan 50). Therefore, with the knowledge that it would be 
near impossible for him to obtain congressional support for his policies, “Correa decided 
to run against the system itself” (Conaghan and de la Torre 271) by not having anybody 
from his political party run for Congress.  
During his campaign to the presidency, Correa promised Ecuadorians that he 
would sign an executive decree that authorizing for the country to carry out a referendum 
enabling for the creation of a constituent assembly — an ad-hoc legislative group that 
would serve the purpose of drafting a new constitution (del la Torre and Conaghan 339). 
The new constituent assembly became the backbone of Correa’s discourse as he promised 
                                                 
3 In terms of economic policy, neoliberalism refers to the idea that “cooperation can create great benefits 
through trade” (Goldstein and Pevehouse 87). Thus, economic neoliberal policies require opening of 
trade markets, support for private sectors and reduction of the role of government in a country’s 
industry (Smith 14). The basis of neoliberal economic policies assume that countries are unlikely to 
restrict open markets and trade for fear of retaliation such as the placement of high tariffs on their 
exporting goods (Goldstein and Pevehouse 87). 
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that it would help end the country’s long history of “a partyarchy” (Conaghan and de la 
Torre (271) — a form of political party bureaucracy in which the strongest and most 
influential political parties effectively assume sovereign power in a state.  
Given that initially, no individual from his political party ran for congress, when 
Correa took office he “immediately faced the consequences of having ceded congress to 
his political rivals” (Conaghan and de la Torre 273). Because of this, he needed 
immediate public support not only to remake the legislative system by switching it from a 
bicameral to a unicameral congress. Additionally, he needed public approval to conduct a 
referendum proposed during his campaign and support to have it passed so that he could 
“enjoy complete control over the writing of the new constitution” (Conaghan and de la 
Torre 274).  
Through his permanent campaign, which included strong advertising for approval 
of the constituent assembly, Correa was able to obtain support from “82 percent of the 
electorate” (Conaghan and de la Torre 273) for the constitutional assembly, ensuring his 
party control over the writing of the new constitution with 80 of the 130 seats available.  
In order to maintain his popularity and his achievements present in the minds of 
Ecuadorians, Correa and his communications team established a weekly radio show — 
this is due to the fact that radio had proven intrinsic to the presidential campaign in 2006 
(Conaghan and de la Torre 275). Correa inaugurated a weekly radio program called The 
President Dialogues with his Constituents. The two-hour program was broadcasted every 
Saturday on 154 radio stations throughout the country (Conaghan 53). — The program 
went on to be broadcasted on radio and television under the title of Enlace Ciudadano 
(Citizen Liaison). — The weekly shows provided (and continue to do so) an outlet for 
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Correa to boast about his accomplishments as president and a forum to admonish his 
opposition (Conaghan & de la Torre 53).  
This gave the president a weekly platform to “publicize his government’s 
accomplishments and lambaste his opponents” (Conaghan and de la Torre 275). 
Additionally, such broadcasts have been continuously held throughout the country, 
providing the president and members of his cabinet with a chance to meet constituents in 
diverse locales, allowing the president “fertile ground for politicking” (Conaghan & de la 
Torre 53). Thus, when the president and his ministers travel to different towns in the 
country to broadcast his radio show, it creates a “direct political impact on the places that 
the president visits” (Conaghan and de la Torre 275).  
Additionally, given that the country could take advantage of free airtime for 
broadcasts related to public interests, Correa’s government also began to use national 
chains in television. The Correa administration has described national chains to be a tool 
that chronicles “the administration’s latest accomplishments, with President Correa 
figuring prominently in each installment” (Conaghan and de la Torre 276).  
Yet, the government has shown that is uses national chains excessively and 
“resorts to using these special announcements, normally reserved for the used in cases of 
emergency to warn or inform the public” (WANIFRA 5) and to push its political agenda. 
Such chains have, on average, lasted from three to 15 minutes (FUNDAMEDIOS 4) and 
used as weekly, primetime “newsreels that chronicled the administration’s latest 
accomplishments” (Conaghan and de la Torre 276). Even though these presidential 
addresses have only lasted a few minutes each, the president has used them not only to 
speak about the progress of his government, but also to “respond to criticisms in a 
 23
particularly aggressive fashion, by discrediting, abusing and insulting his critics” 
(WANIFRA 4).  
In order to maintain his power in office and continue on with electoral victories, 
Correa and his communications team have maintained a constant, perpetual campaign by 
using the country’s media. National mandated chains have been used in increments from 
the time Correa first became president, and as a form of permanent campaign have served 
to boost the president’s popularity (Ornstein and Mann 112). 
FUNDAMEDIOS — Fundación Andina para la Observación y Estudio de 
Medios (Andean Foundation for the Observation and Study of Media) — a 
multidisciplinary group formed in 2006 with the means to “protect the rights and 
freedoms of expression, press, access to information and association” (FUNDAMEDIOS 
4) stated that the usage of national chains is the most powerful tool the government of 
Ecuadorian president Rafael Correa uses to impart the agenda of Correa’s Citizen 
Revolution. The foundation’s Special Report on the usage of Governmental Media Uso 
de cadenas nacionales: ¿Herramienta para contrarrestar la opinión disidente? (Usage of 
national chains: a tool for offsetting dissenting opinions)? published in November 2012, 
states that from 2010 to 2012, the Ecuadorian government used 138 national chains on 
more than 200 television and radio stations free of charge. The 138 national chains 
accounted for 1.464 minutes of broadcasting. Out of these, 137 chains, amounting to a 
total of 1,029 minutes, included messages of “general interest,” which according to 
FUNDAMEDIOS’ report, are used to “polemicize” against the governments opposition. 
On some occasions, Correa used the slots to address the public directly, letting loose with 
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attacks on opponents. On other occasions the slots were used for “negative advertising 
targeting critics” (Conaghan, de la Torre, 276).  
Additionally, FUNDAMEDIOS stated that at the top of Correa’s list of his 
opposition are media and press personalities, whom he has branded as “la prensa 
corrupta,” (the corrupt press), cosely followed by political opposition in government and 
those who have dissenting opinions from that of the government’s ideology and actions.  
Therefore, given the media landscape of the country, privately owned media have 
come to be part of the opposition forces in Ecuador regularly criticized during the chains. 
The FUNDAMEDIOS’ report stated that from the 1,364 national chains that have been 
mandated by the government of Rafael Correa, 46 have been reported to the Foundation 
as having been used to attack media or journalists (including political opposition 
personalities).  
FUNDAMEDIOS stated that among the chains (which are proven to have 
increased over time) that Correa used, in part, to attack journalists, Correa used phrases 
such as ¿Es esto un periodismo imparcial, independiente? — Is this impartial and 
independent journalism? ¿Hasta cuándo? — Until when? Por esto es que Piero alguna 
vez cantó…: “Y todos los días, todos los dias, los diarios publican porquerías.” Y Victor 
Heredia, ante tanta infamia, lo reafirmó diciendo: “Y ese miento miente, que forma de 
mentir.” — That’s why Piero once stated: “And everyday, every single day, newspapers 
publish rubbish,” and Victor Heredia, facing such infamy, reaffirmed it by saying: “And 
they lie, lie, what a form of lying.” 
According to journalists and media entities such as FUNDAMEDIOS, comments 
such as the above, made by the president, set a precedent for a chilling effect. 
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Correa’s Plebiscitary Governance 
A plebiscitary governance is understood as a “way in which presidents can use 
direct, unmediated appeals to public opinion in order to govern ‘over the heads of other 
institutions, especially legislatures” (Conaghan 47). This is especially true as “political 
leaders have become ever more attentive to and sophisticated in gauging public opinion” 
(Ornstein and Mann 32), which in turn, develops a permanent campaign doctrine and 
pushes “unceasing forays for public approval”  (Blumenthal 8). Thus, the permanent 
campaign results in a plebiscitary form of government, as without public approval, 
country executives would not be likely to carry out their political agendas (Blumenthal 
39). 
As previously mentioned, given that Chávez, Morales and Correa, who represent 
Latin America’s “Left Turn” — a more “open-minded, reformist and internationalist” 
(Castañeda 29) left — and the so called “twenty-first-century socialism” — an economic 
model that “explicitly rejects the Soviet model of socialism, seeing it not only as 
dictatorial and ultimately an economic failure but also rooted in a historical context that is 
no longer relevant” (Kennemore and Weeks 1) — they have used the permanent 
campaign strategy to appeal to their electorate. In fact, through their permanent 
campaign, such presidents have been able to effectively push aside their opposition so as 
to carry out their leftist transformations (Conaghan 48).  
It is important to note that although permanent campaigns by Latin America’s new 
left governments have created a plebiscitary form of governing that was effective in 
undermining opposition in congress, “they did so in a fashion that ensured a fair share of 
domestic and international legitimacy for the process” (Conaghan & de la Torre 269). 
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Recurring electoral validation has been the cornerstone or Correa and Chávez’s 
governments, as it allowed them to carry out the presidents’ promised mandate 
(Conaghan & de la Torre 270). Hence, the permanent campaign and its plebiscite, have 
become the driving feature of how both of the Ecuadorian and Venezuelan governments 
function (Ellner 99). 
After being elected president in 2006, Correa’s post-election communications 
strategy was aimed at remaking Ecuadorian political elections through serial elections 
and a high percentage of public support, winning such elections became the “primary 
objective of the new administration; thus, the permanent campaign was born out of 
necessity and directed as a larger scheme of political transformation” (Conaghan and de 
la Torre 280). Therefore, given the president’s push for electoral and governmental 
reform, he needed public support in order to call for a constituent assembly that would 
change the constitution of the country, and thereafter, change the legislative system in the 
country (Conaghan and de la Torre 270).  
After winning the presidency, Correa needed a strategy to appeal to the 
Ecuadorian electorate and their demands. Thus, in order to be “perceived by the 
electorate as the leader who provides the only access door to a quota of power and 
satisfaction to the people’s needs” (Ayala 8), he needed to do so through the media. After 
winning his first election, Correa stated even though he had won the presidential election, 
given the political factions of other parties within the Ecuadorian National Congress, he 
had not won power (Conaghan 47). He recognized that the “power” within the 
Ecuadorian congress was “controlled by economic interests, the banks, the partyarchy 
and the media connected to the banks” (Conaghan 47).  
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Consequently, in order to change the power structure in the country, vital to the 
continuance of Correa’s political agenda, the president tied his governance of the country 
to the consecutive success in elections (Conaghan 47). These elections included the 
approval of the constitutional assembly and filling the seats with members of his party 
(Conaghan and de la Torre 279), and another presidential election success in 2009 after 
passing the new constitution, and another in 2013 for his second term in office after the 
passing of the constitution. 
This meant that Correa needed to mobilize public opinion effectively in order to 
maintain his position as President of Ecuador. To obtain wide approval, he orchestrated a 
permanent campaign through media to further his agenda as well as to disorganize and 
defame his political opposition. This, in turn, caused an “extreme version of the 
plebiscitary presidency” (Conaghan 47). Through his constant campaigning, Correa was 
able to garner enough public support to bypass the National Congress and turn it into an 
irrelevant institution. This turned the post of the president into a very powerful position 
“[closing] the book on a decade of political instability” (Conaghan 48) in the country.  
Yet, Correa’s plebiscite — a direct result of his permanent campaign  (Ellner 99) 
— while ubiquitous, may have had a negative impact in the advancement of Ecuadorian 
democracy (Conaghan and de la Torre 282). Correa’s media campaign used a variety of 
resources afforded to him by the presidency, which included the ability for Correa to 
spread his message with minimal filtering from media outlets (Conaghan 53). Thus, it can 
be argued that by constantly seeking public approval to govern over the country’s 
legislature, Correa may have furthered political polarization and decreased his 
government’s accountability (Santander 234).  
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Throughout his tenure as Ecuadorian president, Correa has been effective in using 
the media to appeal to the Ecuadorian electorate (Conaghan 51). In fact, he understood 
the necessity of the usage of his position as the Ecuadorian Executive to shape “public 
opinion and [advance] his agenda for the constitutional assembly,” (Conaghan 52). He 
has also used public opinion polls effectively, as well as media and communication 
resources available to the presidency to “disorient, demoralize, and disorganize political 
opponents” (Conaghan 47).  
Given his skill in public relations, Correa became the “great communicator … 
who skillfully conveyed popular, commonsense messages by means of a persona that 
appeals to a wide spectrum of the public” (Conaghan 53). In order to maintain a high 
percentage of public support among the electorate, Correa’s communications strategy has 
used a perpetual media advertising campaign to keep the public firmly aligned with him 
and his government (Conaghan and de la Torre 274). Correa’s constant appeal to the 
hearts and minds of the Ecuadorian electorate not only allowed him to completely bypass 
and render the country’s 100 member National Congress obsolete, but it also garnered 
him the political stability that had been vacant for over a decade in the South American 
country (Conaghan 53). 
From the beginning of his presidency, much like Chavez and Morales, Correa 
compiled a media campaign strategy formulated from inside the presidential palace4 that 
included the efficient control of its communications secretariat (Recalde 21). Correa’s 
team was well aware that “the antagonists of the electoral campaign would return” (del 
                                                 
4 Ecuador’s seat of government is referred to as the Palace of Carondelet (Palacio de 
Carondelet). 
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Torre Arauz 5) and try to undermine his office as the executive and deter him from 
accomplishing his plans.  
The entire media operation used to propagate Correa and his agenda to popularity 
was synchronized by the country’s Secretariat of Communication and expedited from the 
presidential palace (Conaghan and de la Torre 275). The communication strategy, much 
like his campaign strategy, included television and radio as the main instruments for 
spreading the president’s message (Freidenberg 137).  
Additionally, the communications strategy consisted of ubiquitous advertisements 
on radio and television on behalf of Alianza PAÍS, which cost the government an 
estimated $6.938 million (Conaghan and de la Torre 276). The actual value of the 
advertisements was $16.7 million, but Correa was able to obtain discounts of as much as 
60 percent for being the Ecuadorian President (Conaghan and de la Torre 276). 
During his communications campaign, Correa passed legislation that prohibited 
political parties and their candidates to the National Assembly to use any governmental 
broadcasting slots and prohibited the private purchase of broadcasting time slots 
(Conaghan and de la Torre 278). Correa and his administration stated that this measure 
was meant to prevent wealthy parties and candidates from having an unfair advantage in 
terms of securing airtime (Conaghan and de la Torre 277). Moreover, Correa took to 
publicly attacking newspapers and journalists who criticized the executive’s dubious 
usage of public resources (Punín Larrea 12).  
Through the permanent campaign that Correa developed from the time he became 
president of Ecuador, he has been able to garner a great deal of public support (Ayala 9). 
This, in turn, has allowed for him and his political party to rule over the heads of the 
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Ecuadorian legislative system. Correa is certain that his government’s permanent 
campaigning efforts have allowed him a high percentage of public support (Conaghan 
and de la Torre 273). With such, he acted with security and firmness in granting his office 
more power. That way, he has been able establish his political agenda not only through 
his influence in the legislative system, but also in the judicial (Ayala 10). 
 
Media situation in Ecuador 
 
By the year 2000, Ecuador and its media were considered to be one of the most 
corrupt in Latin America (Conaghan and de la Torre 271). As stated in previous sections, 
from the 1990s to the mid 2000s, the country underwent a period of high political 
instability.  In fact, three of Ecuador’s democratically elected presidents were overthrown 
and  “half a dozen coups or attempts occurred” (Checa-Godoy 3) during that time. This 
led to a deep economic crisis in the South American country and a banking crisis from the 
year 1999-2000, which “highlighted the deep links between the country’s financial power 
and the country’s major media” (Checa-Godoy 3).  
The crisis shed light on the fact that even though Ecuador had not had major 
issues relating to the oppression of press freedom, banks’ ownership of media indicated 
that media were not reporting important issues (WANIFRA 1). In fact television stations 
and newspapers were used to further the financial interests of the banks that owned them 
and purposefully hid “the imminent arrival of the crisis” (WANIFRA 1).  
The lack of reporting of Filanbanco and Banco del Progreso’s — two of the most 
important banks in Ecuador in the 1990s — financial issues points to the assertion that 
the media in the country backed the interests of the “commercial and political elite,” 
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(Checa-Godoy 3). Additionally, the lack of coverage points to the fact that the media did 
not fulfill their purpose of informing the public fairly on a variety of issues in the public’s 
interest (WANIFRA 1). Moreover, the banking crisis resulted in an economic recession, 
which lead to the decline in newspaper readership in Ecuador (Checa-Godoy 2). Not until 
2009, did newspaper readership pick up to 900,000 daily copies with the most sold 
newspaper in the country being El Universo, from Guayaquil (Checa-Godoy 8).  
Given the deep ties between the banking system in Ecuador and its ownership in 
the media, and media ownership in banks, the 1999-2000 banking crisis brought about a 
loss of credibility in the privately owned media. Additionally, it showed that journalists 
who worked for such media “clearly followed the interests of their perspective groups” 
(Checa-Godoy 6). Thus, Correa has been able to capitalize on the situation by publicly 
“connecting media elites to the discredited banking institutions and political actors” 
(Kitzberger 14) in the country. In fact, Correa’s discourse against privately owned media 
and coverage practices served to shape “his path to the presidency as a political outsider” 
(Kitzberger 19). Correa’s discourse, which rejected economic neoliberal policies and 
Ecuador’s political powers, catapulted him to popularity, turning Correa into a “strong 
political authority” (Kitzberger 19).  
The Ecuadorian President has stated that the private press in the country has been 
historically immoral and failed the public by not providing information that is in the 
public interest (Kitzberger 20). Correa has stated that “private business providing a public 
good,” (Kitzberger 20) is a contradictory concept that endangers democracy through 
media in the country. Therefore, it was the government’s duty to unmask the media and 
provide varied options for news coverage — state sponsored or owned — for the 
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Ecuadorian public (Checa-Godoy 16). The creation of state-controlled media was put 
forward as a method to cope with the private media sector and increase “community 
media-fostering policies” (Kitzberger 11). According to the president, the newly created 
governmental media in the country “are not the government’s media” (Kitzberger 21) but 
belong to the Ecuadorian people. Additionally, Correa has stated that the public media are 
a positive aspect of a growing democracy, as “they do not have the deep dilemma 
between the pocketbook and social compromise in communicating objectively” 
(Kitzberger 21).  
In addition to the creation of public media, given that the privately owned media 
in the country was tied to private economic interests, the Ecuadorian Government 
increased media regulations (Conaghan and de la Torre 277). According to the ideology 
of the Ecuadorian government, these regulations were put forward not to hinder the 
private media’s ability to reach an audience, but to democratize the media system in the 
country and change the historical dynamics of media ownership (Checa-Godoy 16). This 
included governmental media expansion and ownership of television and radio stations, 
as well as newspapers (Punín Larrea 8).  
In order to deal with issues of private-media ownership and market concentration 
of media (Kitzberger 11), Correa has looked to “alter the ownership relations in the media 
sphere” (Kitzberger 21). During the first year of Correa’s government, Correa took 
advantage of his initial popularity and public support to reverse operating licenses on 
some radio and television stations. Later in his tenure as president, Correa used the newly 
established constitution to ban media monopolies in the country (Kitzberger 21).  
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Unlike newspapers, however, radio has maintained its audience from before the 
banking crisis and “continues to be a key industry in the Ecuadorian media” (Checa-
Godoy 8), covering the whole country and broadcasted in both Spanish and Quechua — 
the main indigenous language in the country. Radio is widely popular in the country and 
has historically provided educational components apart from informational and 
entertainment content. It was estimated in 2004 that “287 medium wave radio stations 
and 487 FM stations” (Checa-Godoy 10), existed in the country. Additionally, the 
Catholic Church has maintained a major presence in radio as the Conference of Bishops 
in the country has ownership of approximately 15 stations among the major cities of the 
country.  
Television is another powerful medium in the country, but has been historically 
monopolized by five channels that date back to the 1960s and 1970s and include 
Ecuavisa, Teleamazonas, Gamavisión, TC Televisión, and Telecentro (Checa-Godoy 10). 
These channels, although prevalent, have traditionally broadcasted frivolous content. As 
much as television has remained a powerful medium in country, there has been no public 
ownership of television stations until 2008, where Ecuador gained Gama Television 
(Gamavisión), and TC Televisión “after their owners failed to pay their debts to the State 
after the banking crisis” (Checa-Godoy 12). Additionally, in 2006 TeleSUR, “the inter-
American channel supported by Venezuela, had coverage in most of the country,” 
(Checa-Godoy 12) and in 2008 the Ecuadorian State established a national channel, 
Ecuador TV. The variety of channels has caused for the Ecuadorian audience to be 
divided. Currently, there is not one channel that garners “more that 20 percent of the 
audience share “(Checa-Godoy 12). 
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Correa has used attacks against the media through his permanent campaign 
throughout his presidency. Yet, that is not the only way he has been able to hurt the 
media. In fact, Correa and his government have gone as far as legally persecuting 
newspapers and media entities for reasons such as defamation. In fact two of the major 
cases, El Universo and El Gran Hermano, have been deemed by journalists as a direct 
attempt from the government to silence journalists (Punín Larrea 4). Given that Correa 
has stated “it is one thing to express an opinion, and quite another to speak with certainty, 
make allegations and defame someone” (WANIFRA 6), legal cases against media entities 
are described as milestones to change society.  
The case for El Universo took place after Emilio Palacio wrote a column titled 
“No a las Mentiras” (“No to lies”) was published (WANIFRA 7). President Rafael Correa 
sued the writer of the column and the newspaper for defamation. In 2011, the justice 
system sentenced Palacio and two owners of the paper to three years in prison and having 
to pay $40 million in damages to the President for the crime of “insulting the mandatary” 
(Ayala 4). Correa eventually pardoned the newspaper and Palacio and did not seek 
monetary compensation (WANIFRA 7). 
The case for El Gran Hermano took place after journalists Juan Carlos Calderón 
and Cristhian Zurita published a book by the tile “El Gran Hermano” (“The Great 
Brother”). In this book, the authors chronicled how the President’s brother, Fabricio 
Correa, obtained government contracts worth millions of dollars (WANIFRA 7). Correa 
has asked for $10 million in compensation for moral damages from both journalists 
(Ayala 6)  
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 Furthermore, in 2009, Correa signed a decree into law prohibiting that the private 
media sector in the country have contracts outside of the country (Ayala 4). Thus, media 
entities such as El Comercio, El Universo, La Hora (main newspapers in Ecuador) and 
Vanguardia Magazine, which had at least 19 percent participation in the Caribbean Virgin 
Islands, United States, Panama, the Caiman Islands, the Bahamas and the United 
Kingdom (Ayala 4).  
In addition to media entities having to give up their foreign investments and 
assets, they had to deal with the government cutting on its advertising with such entities. 
In fact, through the new constitution, passed due to the president’s plebiscite in 2008, the 
country experienced “gradual cuts to the participation of the financial powers in the 
media” (Checa-Godoy 13). In fact, the constitution established that the financial sector 
could not have “total or partial stakes in companies operating outside the financial 
activity” (Checa-Godoy 13). This resulted in financial entities being secluded from any 
type of financial relationship with the media in the country.  
Not only did the constitution allow for a decrease in financial influence on private 
media, but also for the rights of government to establish a state media sector (Checa-
Godoy 13). In fact, throughout Correa’s presidency, the Ecuadorian Government has 
“managed to agglutinate and convert a series of mass media into a strange figure called 
‘public media’” (Punín Larrea 7). During Correa’s presidency, the government “has 
seized some media entities and created others” (Vázquez and Saltos 332). Refer to 
appendix.  
The media seized by the government comprised of entities that were owned by the 
countries media and banking monopolies and had not paid their tax dues. Filanbanco 
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(Checa-Godoy 16) — one of the banks that went bankrupt in the late 1990s and which 
was partly responsible for the Ecuadorian banking crisis — for instance, had major shares 
in the Isaías media group and “allegedly owed US $661 million to the state” (WANIFRA 
2) after collapsing. The State nationalized the entity because it had dues to the 
government and had not paid its debt for years (Checa-Godoy 16).   
 While legally, they may not be as financially interlinked as before Correa became 
president, the private media and the banking sector have indicated that the President is 
“an obstacle to an open market and a threat to freedom of the press and expression (Ayala 
9). Thus, given the constant confrontation between the media and the government, the 
private sector in the country has created an opposition coalition, which includes the 
media (Ayala 9).  
 
Thus, it is widely accepted that the laws and policies put forth by the government 
are limiting and “chill assertive reporting” (Hughes and Lawson 5). In fact, organizations 
such as WANIFRA — World Association of Newspapers and News Publishers have 
stated, “the personal attacks by the president have a chilling effect on the independent 
press” (WANIFRA 4). 
Thus, In Ecuador, Correa’s permanent campaign scheme has allowed him high 
levels of public support, turning his government into a plebiscitary one and allowing him 
to legislate the country over the heads of the country’s legislative body. Yet, Correa’s 
permanent campaign strategy, which uses national chains, is assumed to affect press 
freedom as he uses chain broadcasts to constantly criticize media. Yet, if there is a lack of 
press freedom in the country, such has the potential to come from the private sector, 
which has media interests, as much as it does from the government.  
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CHAPTER 3 
 
 
METHOD 
 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
As expanded in the previous chapter, Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa’s 
permanent campaigning strategy has been criticized to be an infringement on press 
freedom in the country. To assess if this is true or not, this study analyzed Correa’s 
method of permanent campaigning through media and how it could create a chilling 
effect among the Ecuadorian press.  
This study examined opinion column content from one of Ecuador’s major 
newspapers, El Universo, for three-month periods in three separate years: 2007, 2009, 
and 2012. This study compared variables levels of permanent campaigning through 
mandated government broadcasts on all private and public channels also known as 
national chains, and analyzed levels of negativity among opinion columns for all three 
years. Two hypotheses follow.  
 
H1: There was an increasing numbers of cadenas nacionales from the time 
President Rafael Correa took office in 2007 up until 2012. 
 
H2: There was an increased chilling effect among opinion columns in El 
Universo, represented by a decrease in the negativity levels of the content of the 
columns. 
 
CONTENT ANALYSIS 
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Content analysis was the method chosen for this study. This method of analysis 
was chosen because it is “the study of recorded human communications” (Babbie 330) 
and allows for the “studying and analyzing communication in a systematic, objective and 
quantitative manner for the purpose of measuring variables” (Wimmer and Dominick 
141). Content analysis is also a “valuable tool in answering many mass media questions” 
(Wimmer and Dominick 141) and is “particularly well suited to the study of 
communications and to answering the classic question of communications research” 
(Babbi 331).  Such questions include the “who says what, to whom, why how and with 
what effect” (Babbi 331)? 
When it comes to media and mass communication, “some topics are more 
appropriately addressed by content analysis” (Babbi 331). Thus, this method provides for 
the evaluated content to be “selected according to explicit and consistently applied rules” 
(Wimmer and Dominick 141). Content analysis “is limited to the examination of recorded 
communications” (Babbi 342), thus, given that messages contained in the mass media are 
“increasingly popular research topics in both the academic sector and the private sector” 
(Wimmer and Dominick 141), this research method provides for an effective way of 
observing data relating to media.  
Content analysis is also an objective method of analyzing data given that “the 
researcher’s personal idiosyncrasies should not enter into the findings” (Wimmer and 
Dominick 141). Therefore, when used, content analysis should yield the same results if 
another researcher were to perform the same research. While a perfectly created criterion 
for choosing and coding the sample is non-existent, content analysis provides a clear and 
replicable form of evaluation (Babbi 342).  
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Furthermore, given that content analysis is a quantitative research method, it 
“provides an accurate representation of a body of messages” (Wimmer and Dominick 
141). This allows for precision in summarizing the results of the research. Content 
analysis simplifies the standardized procedure of observance, and provides the researcher 
with statistical tools that help in the interpretation of the analysis process and the results 
of the research (Wimmer and Dominick 141).  
Content analysis allows for the correction of errors by making it easier to repeat 
portions of the analysis and “permits the study process occurring over a long time” 
(Babbi 342). Hence, for a media analysis, this research method allows for the observance 
and analysis for a period of months, even years.  
 
 
SAMPLING 
 
Cadenas nacionales — governmental programs used as service announcements 
(Conaghan and de la Torre 276) — are one of the government’s most effective tools in 
communicating with the electorate. Chains allow for the government to broadcast its 
message over a multitude of channels on television and radio stations, reaching even the 
most remote rural areas in the country. According to FUNDAMEDIOS, national chains 
are often used as a medium of propaganda to popularize to the electorate the different 
functions being carried out by the government. FUNDAMEDIOS, which is located in the 
Ecuadorian capital of Quito, has stated that it “supports the development of democratic 
media and the exercise of quality journalism” (FUNDAMEDIOS 4). 
Throughout his presidency, Correa has used two different types of chains to 
communicate with his electorate. The first type of chain is the one most commonly 
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utilized as it is a mandated chain, meaning that whenever the government feels the need 
to inform the public about something, it forces all media channels including privately 
owned radio and television stations to tune into the government’s signal 
(FUNDAMEDIOS 2). This is a service provided for the government by radio and 
television stations free of charge (Conaghan and de la Torre 276). Thus, through 
mandated chains, the government is able to reach out to a great number of people as its 
signal gets broadcast in every possible channel in the country. 
The other type of chains only uses the government’s media outlets to pass on the 
message. For instance, from the start of his presidency, President Correa has used chains 
called Sabatinas (broadcasted every Saturday), which are used to report the progress of 
the government to the electorate (WANIFRA 4). These, however, are mostly only 
broadcast through governmental owned or sponsored media, which comprise 
approximately 20 radio and television broadcasting channels (FUNDAMEDIOS 1).  
Given that there is no archive to check upon the time the government has used for 
either type of chain since Correa took over as president, this research used the only 
quantification available for the number of chains and minutes broadcasted. These 
numbers are provided by the FUNDAMEDIOS Foundation and are available from the 
beginning of Correa’s presidency in 2007 up until August of 2012 for mandated chains 
only.  
As aforementioned, in order to come to a conclusion regarding the existence of a 
chilling effect among the Ecuadorian media, this research sampled media from 2007, 
2009, and 2012. In order to objectively analyze and reach an equitable generalization as 
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to the journalistic content of the Ecuadorian media, the research looked at opinion 
column content of El Universo, the major newspaper in Ecuador’s most populous city, 
Guayaquil, as its units of analysis. El Universo has had a daily distribution rate of 
approximately 120,000 copies from 2002 to 2010 (Checa-Godoy 7). Given that Sundays 
are when newspapers have their biggest audiences, the analysis looked at the Sunday 
opinion columns for three months of each year: June, July, and August. These months 
were chosen because August 2012 was the last month FUNDAMEDIOS provided 
available numbers for governmental usage of national chains, making the analysis of 
June, July, and August for each year simpler to accomplish.  
 
MEASURES 
Permanent Campaigning 
 In order to quantify rising or decreasing levels of permanent campaigning in 
Ecuador, the study analyzed the number of mandated national chains — broadcasts by the 
government on all privately and publicly owned broadcasting channels, forcing them to 
tune in to the government’s broadcasting signal so the same signal plays on all radio and 
television channels.  
 Given that there is no archive of these broadcasts, the study looked at quantified 
numbers by FUNDAMEDIOS. The organization published a Special Report in 2013 on 
the usage of governmental national chains in Ecuador titled “Use of National Chains: 
Tools to contrasts dissident opinion.” In the document, FUNDAMEDIOS reports its own 
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data as well as data from the ETHOS foundation, quantified the number and the minutes 
used for mandated national chains from 2007 through August of 2012.  
The Chilling Effect 
The samples for the editorials analyzed were chosen from the El Universo 
newspaper, which is Guayaquil’s largest, privately owned newspaper. The columns were 
accessed through the newspaper’s website, www.eluniverso.com, from which the tab 
Ediciones Anteriores  (previous editions), led to the search of the columns. By isolating 
newspaper issues by year and then month, the newspaper website showed a calendar view 
that allowed choosing only Sunday. While the website did not provide PDF archives for 
each issue, it provided a long list of all the written contents in the newspaper for each 
day. The website then listed articles by the section in which they were published. The 
criteria used for choosing articles to analyze were based on articles containing at least one 
of the following ten words within their content: 
Correa 
Correa is the last name of the Ecuadorian president. When translated into Spanish, the  
word means "belt," but articles containing the word were only chosen when used as the  
president’s last name. 
Presidente 
In English, the word means president. All articles containing this word were chosen. 
 
Ejecutivo 
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In English, the word means executive, i.e. a country’s executive. Articles that used this  
word in reference to the president of a country were used. 
Estado 
In English, the word means State. Similar to Spanish, the word can be used to refer to a 
country, i.e. the State of Venezuela (El Estado Venezolano); or as a noun to describe the 
condition of something, i.e. the state of nature or the gaseous state of water (el estado de 
naturaleza o el estado gaseoso del agua). Only articles that used the word in reference to a 
country were used. 
PAÍS 
PAÍS refers to President Rafael Correa’s political party, Alianza PAÍS — Patria Altiva I  
Soberana (PAÍS Alliance — Proud and Sovereign Fatherland). In English, the word  
directly translates to “country,” but only articles that contained the word in reference to  
the president’s political party were used. 
Revolución 
Referent to Revolución Ciudadana (Citizens’ Revolution). This is President Rafael 
Correa’s and his political coalition’s project of implementation of XXI Century Socialism 
in Ecuador. In English, the word directly translates into “revolution,” but only articles 
containing the word in reference to the Citizens’ Revolution were used. 
Asamblea 
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In English, the word means assembly. For purposes of the article, however, only words  
referent to a form of legislative body were used. In Ecuador, the unicameral legislative  
body is called Asamblea Nacional (National Assembly). Additionally, President Rafael  
Correa’s agenda has called for an Asamblea Constituyente, or a Constituent Assembly to 
draft a new constitution. This happened in 2008 after 80 percent of the Ecuadorian 
electorate voted for its approval via referenda. 
Constitución 
In English, the word means Constitution. Only articles containing the word in reference  
to a country’s constitution (written body of fundamental principles) were used. 
 
Gobierno 
In English, the word means government. All articles containing the word were used. 
 
Dictador 
In English, the word translates into “dictator.” All articles containing this word 
were used. The context in which this word is used to discriminate articles referent to 
government from those that are not, is that in early 2012, an opinion column by El 
Universo’s columnist Emilio Palacio described the president as a dictator. The president 
went on to sue the newspaper and the writer, winning defamatory damages of $40 
million, while the writer and publishers of the newspaper were sentenced to three years in 
prison. President Rafael Correa ultimately issued a pardon to the writer and publisher and 
did not pursue the damages.   
As per the established process of discriminating columns that were related to 
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government though an article’s usage of at least one of the aforementioned 10 words, 
under the link “Columnistas” (Columnists), each issue had the title and author of the 
different columns published for that day. Therefore, one by one, each column was 
checked for the usage of the ten words through the computer’s control/find function for 
each word on the list. 
 
CODING 
 
In order to reach a conclusion about how El Universo newspaper refers to the 
government and whether the privately owned media in Ecuador have indeed become a 
form of movementism in the nation by converting themselves into part of the opposition, 
I had to analyze the existence of a chilling effect among Ecuadorian privately owned 
media.  
 This study examined the levels of negativity among opinion columns. A set of 
standards was used in order to infer whether the articles refer to the government in a 
positive, negative, or neutral manner. The articles were then coded to account for their 
portrayal of government. The coding numbers ran from 1 to 5 indicating if opinion 
articles were negative, slightly negative, neutral, slightly positive, or positive regarding 
the government of Rafael Correa, his presidency, ideology, governmental figures, and/or 
actions. An additional coding number, -1, was given to those articles that contained at 
least one of the ten words, but were unrelated to government in Ecuador or elsewhere. 
These were excluded from the final calculation of the mean and standard deviation of the 
stories for each year in the sample.  
When an article had at least one of the ten words, it was printed. At the end of 
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each three-month period, all articles were numbered. After having printed the articles 
from 2007, 2009, and 2012, all articles were read and given a code from 1-5 (from 
negative to positive), and -1 (for columns that were not relevant to the government). The 
coding standard works as follows.  
Negative (1) 
For a column to be coded negative it had to contain harsh criticism of the current 
Ecuadorian government or the government's actions. The column had to contain criticism 
of government in more than one place in the article (two or more paragraphs). The 
column could be qualified as negative if the author insulted him/herself and/or described 
himself as "bruto," "pelucón," “chuta” (stupid, rich, damn it — colloquial word usage 
signifying insults — “pelucón” is a word dispersed by Correa to describe wealthy 
individuals) in a sarcastic tone, referring to his or her lack of understanding or servile 
manner towards the Ecuadorian government. For the article to have been coded in this 
category, it needed to have overly used adoring language towards government, clearly 
intended to be sarcasm. In order to identify sarcasm, insults and colloquial words meant 
to signify insults are usually enclosed in exclamation marks. Additionally, the usage of 
sarcasm and double-meaning words to convey negativity about the government i.e. “el 
muy inteligente Presidente,” “the very intelligent President,” were also coded as negative.  
For a column to be coded in this category, its author could have written a personal 
attack against the government or government representative such as the president, 
ministers, etc. Most of the time, in order to write deleteriously about a governmental 
figure, the author of a column could have referred to representatives with the word “el” in 
front of their last names i.e. “el Correa,” “el Patiño.” The author could have also used 
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harsh language to attack government or governmental figures. 
Slightly Negative (2) 
For a column to have been coded as slightly negative, and to distinguish it from a 
column that was coded as negative, there needed to have only been slight criticism of a 
governmental action by the author. This means that while an author clearly disagreed 
with a particular governmental action, he or she did not attack specific governmental 
figures and did not use insults or sarcasm to prove his or her point. Therefore, even 
thought the column clearly mentions a dissenting opinion from governmental action, it is 
straightforward about its dissent with government and direct about the delivery of the 
idea without recurring to the use of insults or sarcasm.  
Neutral (3) 
For a column to have ben coded as neutral, it needed to have mentioned facts 
about the functioning of government but did not state dissent or approval. The column 
needed to contain some sort of discussion about the Ecuadorian government’s actions 
and/or situations that involve government, yet the author did not criticize, nor praise 
government or governmental figures.  
Another way that a column can be coded as neutral is if the author mentions 
disagreement with some governmental actions, but also mentions agreeing with others in 
the same article. Therefore, in order for a column to have been classified as a neutral 
column, it needed to have a fair amount of positive as well as negative writing relating 
the Ecuadorian government. 
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Slightly Positive (4) 
For a column to be coded as slightly positive it had to mention agreement with 
governmental actions, yet, in it, the author did not seek to attack or offend the 
government’s opposition. The author merely suggested approval of government, but did 
not praise its governmental figures.  
Positive (5) 
For a column to be coded as positive, it had to strongly approve of the 
government. Columns that contain phrases such as “buen trabajo,” (the good work) were 
qualified as positive. Columns that contained words such as “nuestro” (ours), i.e. 
“nuestro presidente,” “nuestra patria” (our president, our fatherland), were coded as 
positive. Additionally, columns that retaliated an article or column by media in the 
opposition (national or international) and criticized them with words such as “incapaz” 
(incapable), when referring to the governmental opposition, were coded as positive.  
Not related to Government (-1) 
Although the measuring system for choosing the columns to be analyzed from the 
sample allowed for a criteria that targeted content related to the Ecuadorian government, 
some columns that contained at least one of the 10 words used for measurement 
purposes, did not actually relate to the government and /or was irrelevant to governance 
or government in Ecuador or elsewhere. 
In order for a column to be coded as not being related to government, their 
authors must not have referred to the Ecuadorian government, its actions, or ideology 
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and/or must not have acknowledged the Ecuadorian government, its politics, or its 
governmental figures in any way.  
 
 
Analysis Plan 
 
 Results for the research proposed by this study are included in Chapter Four. First 
an overview of the data is reported and analyzed, including the total number of cadenas 
nacionales and the minutes used for them over time, as well as the total number of 
opinion columns from El Universo that were examined. The total numbers for the coding 
of each column are then averaged for each year (mean average). Both hypotheses were 
analyzed to come to a conclusion of whether there exists a chilling effect inflicted by the 
government, mostly through permanent campaigning, among Ecuadorian privately owned 
media.  
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CHAPTER 4 
 
 
RESULTS 
 
Permanent Campaigning and Press Freedom 
 
While permanent campaigning from ‘pink tide,’ leftists governments in Latin 
America may not be a new development, the possible increase of such may be a factor in 
determining how a government is able to affect politics and the media in his or her 
country. In the case of Rafael Correa the claim that his permanent campaigning scheme 
has increased over the years is, in fact, true. By using data from FUNDAMEDIOS, I 
came to the conclusion that Correa used 156 television and radio stations in 2007, to a 
projected 237 in 2012 — even though there was a slight decrease  (by 13) in the number 
of chains used by the president from 2007 to 2008. This is a definite increase in the usage 
of chains by the government over a period of five years. In fact, not only do the number 
of chains increase, but also, the number of minutes used for such chains increase as 
mandated national chains used 700 broadcasting minutes in 2007, to a projected 1,545 
minutes in 2012. Even though the number of minutes used by chains was at an all-time 
high in 2009, with 3,636, there is still a significant increase in the minutes from the 
baseline year of 2007. Thus, as shown in Appendix III, there is definite evidence that 
Correa’s permanent campaigning scheme, which uses national chains to constantly appeal 
to the Ecuadorian electorate, has increased in number and in minutes from 2007 to 2012, 
lending support for the first hypothesis.  
Inversely, hypothesis 2 was not supported, which was that in order to avoid 
trouble with the government and being personally called out by the president of the 
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country, Ecuadorian journalists claim that they must self-censure the negative 
information they publish about the government and this creates a chilling effect, was not 
supported by the data. In fact, of the political columns, quantified and averaged by each 
year (See Appendix Table 3 and 4), there is no definitive evidence of a chilling effect. If a 
chilling effect had occurred, one would have expected to find that the score for the stories 
would have become more positive, on average, both after the passing of the new 
constitution and Correa’s reelection in 2009, as well as after the president sued both the 
journalists who wrote El Gran Hermano and the newspaper El Universo. 
Furthermore, the average of negativity went from 1.74 in average in 2007; to 1.33 
in 2009; to 1.44 in 2012. This means that the columns published by El Universo have 
been negative over time. Thus, the data suggest that, on average, column content show 
the opposite effect than what the chilling hypothesis suggests as the negativity levels in 
such columns has increased.  
Counting those that are explicitly political columns, there is a shift to the columns 
being more negative over time, disproving the chilling effect hypothesis of media being 
“unable” to question the President Correa and/or criticize him and his government. The 
data don’t support the chilling effect. In fact, the non-government media are becoming 
more negative and more strident in terms of criticism. This happens because, as compared 
to the baseline, which is 2007, the average of each year tends to be negative, never 
returning to its original base number.  
Thus, if the chilling hypothesis were to be true, it would be expected that the 
score be well above 2 or 3 in average for each year, suggesting more positive content. 
However, the averages are below where they were in the 2007 baseline — 1.74 — with 
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1.33 in 2009 and 1.44 in 2012. Even though in 2012 is a bit higher than in 2009, the 
numbers never return to base number and remain considerably lower. 
In fact, in addition to the calculation of the mean average, which is used as a 
measure of the central tendency of the classifications of the columns per year, the 
standard deviation was calculated for each year’s totals. The standard deviation in the 
baseline year of 2007 was 0.85, a slight increase in 2009 with 0.96, and a decrease in 
2012 with 0.51. Thus, while there are no anomalies in the standard deviation numbers for 
each year, through the decrease in the number from 2012, I concluded that while the 
columns are getting more critical of the government over time, they are also more similar 
in their classification at the same time.  
Therefore, while a permanent campaign exists and the president has used his 
means of permanent campaign to criticize private media and its journalists, there is no 
evidence of a chilling effect among the Ecuadorian private media as it continues to 
publish increasingly negative content.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Overview and General Discussion 
 
The interruption of regular programing among radio and television stations, so 
that the government’s signal can be broadcasted nationwide is considered by 
FUNDAMEDIOS as a breach on freedom of the press, because it precludes coverage of 
events by any other entity than the government, which may or may not cover events 
fairly. Private media entities in Ecuador argue that the public exposure of the president’s 
antagonism as he “points to the corruption and mediocrity of the mass media” (Rettberg 
and Rincón 80) corrode press freedoms and democracy in the country. The mass media, 
therefore, argue that they are the sole “defenders of the democratic liberties and the only 
ones that can create a front of opposition to the supposed authoritarianism of the 
Government”  (Rettberg and Rincón 80). 
 FUNDAMEDIOS, which agrees with the mass media argument, uses the 29th 
Article of the Reformatory Law to the Television and Radio Broadcasting law to make 
the argument that by overusing national chains — which are also used to criticize mass 
media — the government is acting against the laws it enacted. The article in the law states 
that governmental transmissions should take place during a compatible time with the 
schedules of television and radio broadcasting stations, unless in case of emergency, 
which must be constitutionally declared. According to FUNDAMEDIOS, the government 
is acting against its laws as the national chains often cut into news broadcasts for 
illegitimate reasons. FUNDAMEDIOS states that the Ecuadorian government uses chain 
broadcasts to “correct” journalists’ statements and to defend its positions and political 
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agenda. Therefore, given the constant criticism of the media and journalistic coverage 
within the content of national chains, FUNDAMEDIOS maintains that there is an 
increasing lack of press freedom as print and broadcast journalists become more prone to 
self-censoring out of fear of being publically accused as corrupt by the government 
(FUNDAMEDIOS 5). Thus, the mass media, supported by FUNDMEDIOS, state that the 
president’s permanent campaigning strategies, which include constant criticism of the 
private media, have resulted in the expansion of a chilling effect (WANIFRA 4). Not only 
that, but international actors such as Polity and Reporters Without Borders have criticized 
the Ecuadorian Government for its lack of press freedom, alleging that their indexes, 
which do not provide analysis of content actually published — point to that conclusion. 
Additionally, FUNDAMEDIOS argues that the government forces the Ecuadorian 
pubic to obtain its information from a single source, the government, and qualifies the 
practice as anti-democratic as it has the potential to undermine the press freedom of each 
station by intervening and cutting into their broadcasting time and space. 
FUNDAMEDIOS makes the argument that if the chain minutes continue to increase and 
the government increasingly continues to obligate broadcasting stations to broadcast its 
message, then private stations run the risk of having to broadcast the government’s 
message on a permanent basis. 
Yet, even recognized by FUNDAMEDIOS itself, under the premise of democratic 
discourse, it is in the public’s interest that government and its authorities give the public a 
regular account of their actions. In fact, the Inter-American Court of Human rights has 
established that it is the government’s duty to inform the public of its actions for which 
the use of mass communication (including private media forms) is necessary.  
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Nonetheless, the imperative measure of freedom of the press is based upon a 
chilling effect and whether or not private media entities and journalists that work for such 
self censure themselves in order to prevent trouble with the government or with the 
public that is likely to support the government.  
Through the measures explained in the above chapters, the levels of negativity 
were measured for opinion columns Ecuador’s most popular privately owned newspaper 
for three years: 2007, 2009, and 2012. For each year, political columns from each Sunday 
in June, July and August were analyzed. It was found that over time, there is no 
contingent chilling effect as columns have rising levels of negativity instead of rising 
levels of positive rhetoric among them.  
This means that although many organizations and media entities assert a chilling 
effect and a decline in press freedom in the country, their published rhetoric in opinion 
columns actually proves otherwise.  
Thus, my conclusions contradict the general understanding of press freedom in 
terms of the broader literature on democracy. While it is clear that Correa used his 
permanent campaign to let loose on media and verbally attack journalists and journalistic 
entities, the numbers calculated through content analysis do not support the theory that 
these attacks actually result in a chilling effect among the Ecuadorian press.  
This is a unique finding in the sense that indexes of press freedom such as 
Reporters Without Borders and Freedom House, have a tendency to not analyze the actual 
content published or broadcasted by the press, to instead base their analysis on interviews 
with journalists, laws enacted by governments, or other actions taken by a governments 
that can be construed as posing a threat to press freedom. In fact, for “pink tide,” leftist 
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governments in Latin America such as Argentina, Ecuador and Venezuela, the press 
freedom scores in such indexes has drastically decreased since presidents took to national 
chains to criticize media.  
Thus, given that the content analysis provides an inverse result than what was 
expected, I can also conclude that major democracy and press freedom indexes are 
lacking in analysis for their conclusions. Given that content analysis showed that public 
criticism of media does not result in a chilling effect in the case of Ecuador and its major 
newspaper El Universo, the popular claim that pink tide regimes have become illiberal 
democracies that restrict press freedom, might also prove to be invalid if such analysis 
was done in those countries.  
 
IMPLICATIONS 
 
The study aimed to provide a broader overview of how the columns and 
columnists portray the government in order to disseminate whether or not a chilling effect 
exist in Ecuador. It would have been ideal to overview more than one newspaper, 
especially El Comercio, Quito’s (the Ecuadorian capital) largest privately owned 
newspaper and one of the largest in the country. However, due to its archiving system, it 
was impossible to retrieve the complete data necessary to make the analysis for the years 
2009 and 2012. Given that the analysis could not be carried out with only data from 2006, 
the overall analysis only focuses on data from El Universo instead. 
It would be ideal to analyze columns from more than one newspaper in order to 
have a better idea of the existence of a chilling effect among the Ecuadorian media. 
Because of time constraints and a lack of resources, I was unable to analyze the opinion 
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columns of other newspapers. It would be interesting not only to access the archives to 
analyze the existence of a chilling effect over time, but also to compare different 
mediums to each other. An analysis between public and privately owned media or media 
printed and broadcasted in different regions of the country would be ideal.  
Not only that, but a more thorough analysis would improve the statistical 
significance of the results. For instance, if replicated, this study should look to analyze 
more than three years, and look at all Sundays for the entire duration of the presidency of 
Rafael Correa and a few years before so as to have a measure and base for comparison.  
Likewise, it would be essential for the study to have more validity if for the 
content analyzed; the methods also included inter-coder reliability. Through that, there 
can be a more accurate depiction of the actual analysis of the data and more reliable and 
replicable results.  
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APENDIX I 
 
Ecuadorian Government Ownership of Media 
 
The following are data of the governmental media in Ecuador. As stated in the 
text, when President Rafael Correa took office in 2007; he looked to re-establish the 
media ownership system in Ecuador. Thus, from the beginning of his mandate the 
government seized private media entities that were in debt with the government, created 
new media, and administered other media.  
 
 
Data obtained from WANIFRA’s Report on Press Freedom in Ecuador. January 2012. 
* Seized by the government before Correa was elected as president. 
 
 
APENDIX II 
 
Expectations for first hypothesis  
 The first hypothesis of this study questions the existence of the permanent 
campaign in Ecuador through the usage of national chains. Given the literature retrieved 
Media	seized	by	the	state Public	Media
*El	Telégrafo EcuadorTV
GamaTV Radio	Pública	del	Ecuador
TC	Televisión El	Telégrafo
Cable	Noticias PP	El	Verdadero
Cable	Deportes
Radio	Universal
ArthurOh
Carrousel State-run	Media
Radio	Super	K	800 El	Ciudadano	(print	and	digital)
La	Onda	Magazine Radio	de	la	Asamblea	Nacional	
El	Agro ANDES	Ecuadorian	News	Agency
Valles
Samborondón
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and reviewed, I hypothesized that there was a prevalent permanent campaign in Ecuador 
and it existed through increasing numbers of national chains during President Rafael 
Correa’s tenure as mandatary. Thus, the expectation for my hypothesis was that over 
time, from 2007 to 2012, there would be a constant increase in the number of chains and 
they would have a steady presence throughout the President’s tenure.  
 
 
 
APPENDIX III 
 
Measures of permanent campaign 
 
In the literature review, it was stated that a reliable measure of permanent 
campaigning would be the number of national chains that the Correa and his government 
had used throughout his tenure as president. Although two types of chains have been used 
over the years, the first imposed by the government on all public and private broadcasting 
channels and the second represented by weekly chains broadcasted on the state-owned 
and state-sponsored television and radio stations only.  
2007 2009 2012 
Permanent Campaigning National Chains 
MORE CHAINS 
LESS CHAINS 
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The following table provides data of the number of imposed chains the president 
used from 2007. All data were obtained from FUNDAMEDIOS, which provided numbers 
of national chains up until August 2012.  
 
 
 
Data obtained from FUNDAMEDIOS’ Special Report on the Usage of Governmental 
National Chains in Ecuador.  
*2012 data only calculated from January through August of that year. 
**Projected number of chains for the entire duration of 2012 
 
 Given that the data only provided partial data for 2012, I calculated a projected 
number of chains that would represent the trends of chain usage by the government for 
the duration of the entire year.  
 
 
 
Year Television	Chains Radio	Chains Total	Chains	(Television	and	Radio) Total	Broadcast	Minutes
2007 73 83 156 700
2008 95 48 143 1191
2009 275 58 333 3636
2010 152 71 223 2110
2011 264 87 351 2645
*2012 126 32 158 1030
*Total 985 379 1365 11793
**2012 189 48 237 1545
**Total 1048 395 1443 11827
Year Television	Chains Radio	Chains Total	Chains	(Television	and	Radio) Total	Broadcast	Minutes
2007 73 83 156 700
2008 95 48 143 1191
2009 275 58 333 3636
2010 152 71 223 2110
2011 264 87 351 2645
**2012 189 48 237 1545
**Total 1048 395 1443 11827
 61
Data obtained from FUNDAMEDIOS’ Special Report on the Usage of Governmental 
National Chains in Ecuador.  
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APPENDIX IV 
Number of Chains reported to have been against opposing media/journalists 
As stated within the text, Correa has used national chain broadcasts to let loose on 
attacks on journalists and media entities that have been critical of him and his mandate. 
The following table highlights the number of national chains used by the president to 
specifically attack journalists or media entities from the time that he came into power as 
president.  
 
 
Data obtained from FUNDAMEDIOS’ Special Report on the Usage of Governmental 
National Chains in Ecuador.  
 
 
 
As the chart above shows, there is a sharp increase in the number of chains used 
solely for the purpose of criticizing or “correcting” claims made by the private media. 
From 2010 to 2011 the government increased the number of chains against the media by 
16 (from 4 to 20), and maintained the 2011 number of chains for 2012.  
Year	 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Chains 2 3 4 20 20
0 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Chains agaist media 
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APPENDIX IV 
Expectation for second hypothesis 
 Given that through the first hypothesis, it was found that a permanent campaign 
on behalf of Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa is prevalent through steady numbers 
(and minute usage) of national chains. Additionally, from the beginning of his tenure as 
President in 2007, there has been an increase in the number of chains used to attack 
journalists and media. This led me to the hypothesis that over time, media would be 
likely to publish more positive content about the government and the President. Given 
that media entities and journalist are not likely to want to end up being criticized by the 
Correa on a national platform, they would be prone to publishing less negative content 
about him. Thus, the expectation for the second hypothesis were that over time, the 
columns from El Universo would refer more positively about the Ecuadorian government 
and Correa.  
 
 
2007 2009 2012 
Series 1 
MORE POSITIVE 
MORE NEGATIVE 
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APPENDIX VI 
TABLE 1: Coding 
The method of analysis for this thesis was content analysis. The following table is 
a depiction of the coding of El Universo opinion columns for all three years analyzed — 
Three months per year: June, July and August. The chart shows the date in which each 
opinion column was published, its title and coding or classification number (the lower the 
number, the more negative it is).  Data from 2009 forward also contain the name of the 
opinion column’s author. These data were unavailable for 2007. 
2007 
 
 
Number June Title	 Classification
1 3 Otra	comisión 2
2 3 Los	problemas	de	la	altura 1
3 3 Emigrantes	en	Estados	Unidos 3
4 10 Patihorror 1
5 10 Recuerdo	de	la	Asamblea 1
6 17 Rosanna	y	Alexis 1
7 24 Trampita 2
8 24 Paranoia 1
9 24 ¿Habrá	reforma	tributaria? 2
Number July Title	 Classification
10 1 Mangajo 1
11 1 Metodología	inicial 2
12 8 Miedo 1
13 8 El	maestro	y	las	reglas 1
14 8 La	esquina	del	idioma	 -1
15 8 Mindo,	cinco	años	después -1
16 15 Patifiesta 1
17 15 Grabaciones,	filmaciones,	prohibiciones 1
18 15 Rendición	de	cuentas 1
19 22 El	de	antes 1
20 22 El	homenaje	a	Alfonso 2
21 29 Un	instante	de	silencio 1
22 29 A	la	der… 2
23 29 Una	carta	para	Rafael 1
24 29 Suben	precios 3
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2009 
 
Number August Title	 Classification
25 5 El	himno 1
26 5 Cheerleaders 1
27 5 Es	difícil	ser	columnista 3
28 5 Puerto	Morona 3
29 12 La	foto 1
30 12 5—5—5 2
31 12 El	costo	del	dinero 3
32 19 Las	ofertas 3
33 19 Bronca 3
34 19 Disolverán	el	Congreso 2
35 26 El	migrante	emigrado 1
36 36 Obstáculos 3
37 26 Socialismo	del	siglo	XXI 3
June Title	 Author Classification
7 El	poder	y	el	miedo Francisco	Febres	Cordero	 1
7 Chamanes	y	'doras' Fernando	Coronel 1
7 Tu	Voz Emilio	Palacio 1
7 Nacionalismo	metodológico Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 3
14 Sacrilegio Emilio	Palacio 1
14 Los	comicios	andinos Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 4
14 ¡Mucho	es	el	Correa! Francisco	Febres	Cordero	 1
21 Desafío	comercial Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 3
21 Sysan	Boyle	y	la	envoltura Fernando	Fougéres 3
21 Horrores	y	errores Emilio	Palacio 1
21 Silencio	y	poder Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 2
21 Brothers		&	Co.	 Francisco	Febres	Cordero	 1
28 San	Vicente,	Ecuador,	Antigua Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 3
28 La	pelea	sigue Emilio	Palacio 1
28 Las	lecciones	de	Irán Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega -1
28 La	revolución	humanizada Francisco	Febres	Cordero	 1
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July Title	 Author Classification
5 Conferencia	Magistral Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 2
5 Me	da	pena Emilio	Palacio 1
5 La	Democracia,	un	bien	público	regional Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega -1
5 Ventajas	de	la	involución	 Francisco	Febres	Cordero	 1
12 Tracalada	de	valientes Emilio	Palacio 1
12 Las	relacioned	con	Colombia Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 2
12 Adivinanzas Francisco	Febres	Cordero	 2
19 Otra	vez	premiado Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 2
19 Shh…	secreto Emilio	Palacio 1
19 Ramon	Espinel,	ministro	de	Agricultura Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 4
19 El	milagroso Francisco	Febres	Cordero	 1
26 ¡Que	callen	ellos! Francisco	Febres	Cordero	 1
26 Caos	en	la	ciudad Vianna	Maino -1
26 El	tiempo	corre Emilio	Palacio 1
26 Centrarse	en	lo	fundamental Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 1
August Title	 Author Classification
2 Capitalismo	y	socialismo Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo -1
2 Lenin,	despierta Emilio	Palacio 1
2 Conflictos	entre	países	bolivarianos Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 3
2 Sin	respiro Francisco	Febres	Cordero	 1
9 Desabastecimiento Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 2
9 La	hora	de	los	locos Emilio	Palacio 1
9 El	discurso Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 3
9 El	aprendizaje Francisco	Febres	Cordero	 1
16 Salarios	justos Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 2
16 Los	'contreras' Bernard	Fougéres 3
16 Dos	demandas Emilio	Palacio 1
16 Precios	y	agricultura Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 4
16 Los	Comités Francisco	Febres	Cordero	 1
16 La	esquina	del	idioma Piedad	Villaviciencio	Bellolio -1
23 Compás	de	espera Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 2
23 7	esperan Emilio	Palacio 1
23 Evidencias	silenciosas Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 2
30 Caridad	en	la	verdad Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo -1
30 Enamorada	de	mi	maestro	 Bernard	Fougéres -1
30 Autogolpe Emilio	Palacio 1
30 Unasur Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 2
30 La	ausencia Francisco	Febres	Cordero	 1
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2012 
 
 
Number June Title	 Author Classification
1 3 ¿Burbuja?	¿Sobreendeudamiento? Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 2
2 3 Las	tarjetas Francisco	Febres	Cordero 1
3 3 Más	sobre	semillas	y	variedades Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 2
4 10 Personas	jurídicas	y	responsabilidad	penal Xavier	Zavala	Egas -1
5 10 Contra	Colombia Francisco	Febres	Cordero 1
6 10 Desigualdades	territoriales Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega -1
7 17 Buitres Francisco	Febres	Cordero 1
8 17 Ley	del	hielo Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 1
9 24 Retornan	controles Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 1
10 24 Una	foto Francisco	Febres	Cordero 1
11 24 Un	panorama	sombrío Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega -1
Number July Title	 Author Classification
12 1 Wen	Jiabao	en	Sudamérica Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo -1
13 1 El	club	de	los	perseguidos Francisco	Febres	Cordero 1
14 1 Confianza	en	el	futuro Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 2
15 8 Dar	para	recibir Daniela	Trujillo -1
16 8 Happy	birthday,	Julian Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 2
17 8 Carros Cecilia	Ansaldo	Briones -1
18 8 Los	mudos Francisco	Febres	Cordero 1
19 8 Realineamientos	Sudamericanos	 Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega -1
20 15 Ecuador	quiere	colocar	bonos Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 1
21 15 El	pirata	del	Guayas Cecilia	Ansaldo	Briones -1
22 15 La	batalla	perdida Francisco	Febres	Cordero 1
23 22 ¿Qué	pretendemos	con	Irán? Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 2
24 22 Diagnóstico	Taurino Francisco	Febres	Cordero 2
25 22 Funcionarios	del	Estado Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 2
26 29 ¡Despacito! Francisco	Febres	Cordero 1
27 29 Elogio	de	la	locura Mauricio	Gándara	Gallegos 1
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TABLE 2: AVERAGE  
 The following table represents the average number of the column coding 
classifications for each year. The mean average for each year was quantified after 
removing the columns coded as -1 from the sample. Because such columns were not 
related to the newspaper’s depiction of the government, their classification made them 
invalid for the analysis.  
 
 As shown in the table above and the chart below, the average of the classifications 
of the columns provides further understanding in how the second hypothesis was not 
valid. In fact, the results oppose the expectation of the hypothesis as they show a 
continual increase in negativity of columns. While the average for 2012 is slightly less 
negative than in 2009, the difference does not represent a sufficient change to be 
Number August Title	 Author Classification
28 5 Novedades	en	el	Golfo Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 2
29 5 Las	Firmas Francisco	Febres	Cordero 1
30 5 Confrontación	y	desarollo	económico Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega -1
31 12 Mercosur	no	nos	conviene Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 2
32 12 Ciudad	mínima Cecilia	Ansaldo	Briones -1
33 12 Me	aburren	las	carreteras Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 2
34 19 Control	de	cambios Walter	Spurrier	Baquerizo 2
35 19 Regreso	del	Chucky	Seven Francisco	Febres	Cordero 1
36 26 El	imposible	aprendizaje Francisco	Febres	Cordero 1
37 26 Me	robaron	la	capacidad	de	elegir Manuel	Chiriboga	Vega 2
Year 2007 2009 2012
AVERAGE 1.74 1.33 1.44
ST.	DEV 0.85 0.96 0.51
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considered not negative, especially since it is still below the 2007 average.  
The standard deviation was also calculated for each year, showing that the sample 
gets closer together in average over time.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 70
REFERENCES 
 
Ayala, Rubén. "Entre el respeto y la libertad: la prensa y su relación compleja con el  
gobierno ecuatoriano." Revista Andina de Estudios Políticos. 9 (2011): n. page. 
Web. 
Babbie, Earl. The Practice of Social Research. 13th ed. Belmont: Wadsworth, 2010.  
Print. 
Blumenthal, Sidney. The Permanent Campaign: Inside the World of Political Operatives.  
Boston: Beacon Press, 1980. Print. 
Blumenthal, Sidney. The Permanent Campaign of Rafael Correa: Making Ecuador's  
Plebiscitary Presidency. Revised ed. New York: A Touchstone Book, 1982.  
Print.. 
Brader, Ted. Campaigning for Hearts and Minds: How Emotional Appeals in Political  
Ads Work. 1st ed. . Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2006. Print. 
Castañeda, Jorge. "Latin America's Left Turn." Foreign Affairs. 85.3 (2006): 28-43. 
Charnock, Emily Jane. "George W. Bush and the Permanent Campaign Trail." Public  
Purpose. III. (2011): 17-32. Print. 
Checa-Godoy, Antonio. "The banking sector and media ownership: the case of Ecuador."  
Revista Latina de Comunicación Social. 67. (2012): 125-147. Print. 
Conaghan, Catherine. "Ecuador: Correa's plebiscitary Presidency." Journal of  
Democracy. 19.2 (2008): 40-60. 
Conaghan, Catherine, and Carlos de la Torre. "The Permanent Campaign of Rafael  
Correa: Making Ecuador's Plebiscitary Presidency." The International Journal of 
Press/Politics. 13. (2008): 267-276. Print. 
 71
Danziger, James. Understanding the Political World. 10th ed. New York: Longman,  
Pearson Education, 2011. Print. 
de la Torre, Carlos, and Catherine Conaghan. "The Hybrid Campaign: Tradition and  
Modernity in Ecuador's 2006 Presidential Election." The International Journal of 
Press/Politics. 14. (2009): 335-352. 
del Torre Arauz, Patricia. ¿En qué escenario ganó Correa? La sorpresiva primera vuelta.  
Quito: Observatorio Político Cela, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Quito, 2007 
Ellner, Steve. "The Distinguishing Features of Latin America's New Left in Power : The  
Chávez, Morales, and Correa Governments." Latin American Perspectives. 39. 
(2011): 96-114. 
Freidenberg, Flavia. "Ecuador 2011: Revolución Ciudadana, Estabilidad Presidencial y  
Personalismo Político." Revista de Ciencia Política. 32.1 (2012): 129-150. Web. 
FUNDAMEDIOS,. Informe Especial — Uso de Cadenas Nacionales: ¿Herramienta  
para contrarrestar la opinión disidente?. Quito: FUNDAMEDIOS Expresión de 
Libertad, 2012. Print. 
Goldstein, Joshua, and Jon Pevehouse. International Relations. 9th. Longman, Pearson:  
New York, 2010-2011. Print. 
Hughes, Sallie, and Chappell Lawson. "The Barriers to Media Opening in Latin  
America." Political Communication. 22.1 (2007): n. page. Web. 
Kennemore, Amy, and Gregory Weeks. "Twenty First Century Socialism? The Elusive  
Search for a Post-Neoliberal Development Model in Bolivia and Ecuador."  
Bulletin of Latin American Research, Journal of the Society for Latin American  
Studies. (2011) 
 72
Kitzberger, Philip. The Media Activism of Latin America’s Leftist Governments: Does  
Ideology Matter?. Hamburg: GIGA German Institute of Global and Area Studies 
(Leibniz-Institut für Globale und Regionale Studien), 2011. Web. 
Klein, Joe. "The Perils of the Permanent Campaign." TIME. 30 10` 2005: n. page. Web.  
14 Apr. 2013.  
Larrea , T. (2007). En qué pensamos los ecuatorianos al hablar de democracia? estudio  
cualitativo de las percepciones y actitudes ciudadanas sobre la democracia  
ecuatoriana. Quito: Participación Ciudadana. 
Lowi, Theodore. The personal presidency: power invested, promise unfulfilled.. 1st ed. .  
Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985. Print.  
Dunn Tempas, Kathryn, and James McCann. "Testing the permanence of the permanent  
campaign: an analysis of presidential polling expenditures, 1997-2002 ." Public 
Opinion Quarterly. 71.3 (2007): n. page. Print.  
O'Neil, Patrick. Essentials of Comparative Politics. 3rd ed. . New York: W. W. Norton &  
Company. , 2010. Print. 
Ornstein, Norman, and Thomas Mann. The Permanent Campaign and its Future. 1st ed. .  
Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute and The Brookings Institution,  
2000. Print. 
Polity IV Country Report 2010: Ecuador. In (2010). Polity IV. Retrieved from  
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity06.htm 
Punin Larrea, María Isabel. "Rafael Correa y la Prensa Ecuatoriana: una Relación de  
Intrigas y Odios." Razón y Palabra, Primera Revista Electrónica en América 
Latina Especializada en Comunicación. 75. (2011): n. page. Web. 
 73
Recalde, Paulina. "Elecciones presidenciales 2006: una aproximación a los actores del  
proceso." Íconos, Revista de Ciencias Sociales. 27 (2007): 15-25. Web. 
República Argentina. Autoridad Federal de Servicios de Comunicación Audiovisual. Law  
26.522, Article 75. Buenos Aires: , 2009. Web. 
Rettberg, Angelika, and Oman Rincón. Medios, democracia y poder: una mirada  
comparada desde Colombia, Ecuador, Venezuela y Argentina . 1st ed. Bogotá: 
Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Ciencias Sociales-CESO: Facultad de 
Artes y Humanidades-CEPER, 2012. Print. 
Santander, Pedro. "Latin America: political communication and media discourse in  
contexts of social and revolutionary transformations." Journal of Multicultural 
Discourses. 5.3 (2010): 227-237. Web. 
Sparrow, Nick, and John Turner. "The permanent campaign the integration of market  
research techniques in developing strategies in a more uncertain political 
climate ." European Journal of Marketing. 35.9/10 (2001): 984-1002. Web. 
Trajer, Robert, Joseph Russomanno, and Susan Dente Ross. The Law of Journalism and  
Mass Communication. 2nd ed. Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, SAGE, 2010. Print. 
UNESCO. Assessment of Media Development in Ecuador — 2011. Quito: United Nations  
Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization / International Programme for  
the Development of Communications, 2011. Web. 
 "Uso y abuso de la cadena nacional en América Latina." Cronista 31 07 2012, n. pag.  
Web. 15 Apr. 2013. 
Valenzuela, Arturo. "Latin American Presidencies Interrupted." Journal of Democracy.  
15.4 (2004): n. page. Web. 
 74
Vázquez, Lola, and Napoleón Saltos. Ecuador, su realidad. 19th ed. Quito: Fundación  
José Peralta, 2011-2012. Print. 
Waisbord, Silvio. "Between Support and Confrontation: Civil Society, Media Reform,  
and Populism in Latin America." Communication, Culture and Critique. 4 (2011):  
97-117. Web. 
WANIFRA,. Increasing Media Plurality or Controlling the Debate: a Report on Press  
 
Freedom in Ecuador, January 2012. Paris: WANIFRA - World Association of  
 
Newspapers and News Publishers, 2012. 1-10. Print. 
 
Wimmer, Roger, and Joseph Dominick. Mass Media Research, an Introduction. 7th ed.  
Belmont: Thomson Wadsworth, 2003. Print. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
